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1 Introduction
One of the key issues in understanding how tax policies affect labour supply is the intra-household
allocation of time and consumption. This is in particular the case of welfare benefits, such as
the Working Family Tax Credit program in the UK and the Earned Income Tax Credit in the
US, aimed at providing work incentives and a safety net against poverty at the same time.
The models used to address these issues typically take the household as a unit with unitary
preferences (from Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, to the recent work of Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and
Shaw, 2016), and while the collective models of the family (Chiappori, 1988, 1992) offer a solution
for improvement by modeling intra-household resource allocation, the interest of this framework
for policy evaluation is hampered by its inability to predict the impact of welfare policies on
the sharing rule.1 The evaluation of welfare policies for the family thus ultimately requires an
equilibrium model of match formation and intra-household resource allocation.
Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2016), hereafter GJR, develop a search-matching and bar-
gaining model of the marriage market, à la Shimer and Smith (2000), in which they add labour
supply and household production. In this model, individuals marry because of returns-to-scale
in home production and because of complementarities between spouses’ characteristics in pref-
erences (homophily), in the Beckerian tradition (Becker, 1981, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). At
the same time, it incorporates resource sharing and labour supply as in collective models.
Modeling both marriage and consumption allows to endogenize the sharing rule, i.e. how
resources are split between spouses. As in collective models, spouses’ labour supplies are chosen
efficiently along the Pareto frontier of the achievable set. The outside option is the value of
remaining single, which is equal to the instantaneous utility of the wage plus the option value
of a potential future marriage. Couples are formed if an excess of public good is produced in
the association. The resulting surplus is split between spouses by Nash bargaining. Divorce is
endogenous and occurs when the idiosyncratic, match-specific public good quality becomes too
low for the match to remain mutually beneficial. As a result, the model generalizes both the
collective labour supply literature, to which we add an explicit mechanism for the sharing rule,
and marriage market models, to which we add search frictions.
This paper develops a version of GJR’s model without home production time uses. This
considerably widens the scope of possible applications, given the scarcity of precise data on
individual inputs to domestic production over time. We first derive conditions under which
the model remains identified. Second we repeat GJR’s analysis of time changes in the labour
supplies of men and women and in the distributions of wages and education by gender and
marital status, with one difference. We estimate a new set of preference parameters for each
year of observation. This gives a high degree of flexibility to fit labour supply changes over time,
and allows us to study in greater details the channels behind the observed dynamics in labour
supply and marriage decisions over the period.
We find that the preference for leisure, in particular for men, should change over time in
order for the model to precisely fit the observed changes in labour supply over the period. In
1Yet, the factors influencing the sharing rule, such as sex ratios or rules about divorce, are now well understood,
and they can be influenced by policy. See Grossbard-Shechtman (1984, 1993), Brien (1997), Lundberg, Pollak,
and Wales (1997), Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), Del Boca and Flinn (2005), Amuedo-Dorantes and
Grossbard (2007), Seitz (2009).
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spite of a high degree of flexibility in estimated preferences, such changes are not enough to
fully recover observed changes in assortative matching. We also need to allow for changes in the
strength of homophily (in particular with respect to spouses’ education) in order to explain the
observed changes in sorting (e.g. mean wages by marital status).
Many studies have looked at the link between marriage and earnings. For example, the well-
documented increase in assortative mating by education is expected to impact income inequality
both within households and between individuals. Most studies however find almost no effect
(Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos, 2014b,a, Breen and Salazar, 2011, Eika, Mogstad,
and Zafar, 2014). Now, as Breen and Salazar (2011) emphasizes, it could be that educational
sorting among partners is a poor proxy for sorting on earnings. In that case, an equilibrium
model of marriage and labour supply is needed to relate education and earnings at the family
level. Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) and Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) develop
models for jointly analysing marriage decisions and the investment in schooling and skills. Our
approach rather focuses on the interrelation between marriage and labour supply, with exogenous
distributions of wages and education. This amounts to take the changes in wage inequality as
given and study its impact on marriage and labour supply decisions.
We present the data and some facts about labour supply and sorting in the next section.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 deals with identification and estimation.
2 The Data
The data are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 1991 to 2008.2 This
panel is representative of the British population over the period excluding Northern Ireland and
North of the Caledonian Canal. We select individuals who are between 22 and 50 years old at
the time of interview and who are either single or living with a different-sex partner (married
or cohabiting). The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive annual waves. We use
information on usual gross pay per month for the current job and the number of hours normally
worked per week (including paid and unpaid overtime hours). Hourly wage is the usual gross
pay per month divided by the number of hours normally worked per month (without overtime).
Wages are computed in 2008 pounds.
Many individual-year observations on wages are missing because zero hours worked are re-
ported. The overall labour market participation rate is 69% for men and 65% for women, with
some variations by education and marital status. The participation rate is 73% for high edu-
cated, married women and 59% for low educated, single women (respectively, 83% and 66% for
men). In order to reduce the number of zero market hours and missing wages, we replace current
observations on wages and market hours by a (kernel-weighted) moving average of past, present
and future observations.3 The participation rate consequently jumps to 87% for men and 88%
for women. Then we trim the 1% top and bottom tails of wage and market work variables.
GJR construct a Family Values Index (FVI) based on individuals’ responses (1: strongly
agree; 2: agree; 3: neither agree nor disagree; 4: disagree; 5: strongly disagree) to various
2For a more detailed description, see GJR.
3We use a Gaussian kernel weighting function yielding weights 1, 0.882, 0.607, 0.325, 0.135, 0.044, 0.011 for
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 years apart.
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statements about children, marriage, cohabitation and divorce. The signs of factor loadings
are chosen so that our family values index is a measure of conservativeness.4 GJR show that
family values play an important role in home production, less so in the private preferences for
consumption and leisure. Moreover, the FVI changes very little over time. We will use the
family values index as a control, but we could omit it in this particular application.
Figure 1 summarizes the main trends in labour market outcomes by gender and marital
status over the 1991-2008 period. Figure 1a shows that men earn more than women, and that
married individuals earn more than singles. Wages increase in the decade following 1995, and
this increase is steeper for married people than for singles. By the end of the period, married
women have caught up with single men but the gap between married men and women remains
unchanged. Figure 1b shows that these wage changes have had little effect on aggregate labour
supply. The ordering in hours worked between married and single men and women remains
very stable. Married males work more than single males, who work much more than single and
married females. Nevertheless, by the end of the period, married women have increased labour
supply by almost three hours per week, while single men have decreased labour supply by two
hours.
Figure 2 shows that the female-male wage ratio has increased over those years, from 0.78 to
0.92 for singles and from 0.67 to 0.76 for married individuals. The decomposition by education
in Figure 2b shows that this increase mainly concerns lower education levels. For high educated
individuals, the gender wage gap has remained stable for singles and has slightly increased for
married people.
Figure 3 plots the distributions of log wages among couples in 1991-92 and in 2007-2008.
Wage dispersion has increased over the period, particularly for married women. The shift to
the right of the distribution of married women’s wages is accompanied by an increase in the
correlation of wages among couples (0.27 in 1991 and 0.35 in 2007).
Figure 4 documents the repartition of wages within couples. It plots the distributions of the
female share of total household labour income (i.e. the aggregate wage) across married couples,
separately for 1991-1992 and 2007-2008. The left panel displays the density and the right panel
the cumulative distribution. The 2007-2008 distribution stochastically dominates the 1991-1992
distribution but not by a large extent. A slow transition toward a reduction of the gender wage
gap within couples yet seems to be at work.
Finally we note that the strong increase in wages previously documented, particularly for
women and married individuals, is paralleled by an increase in education for women and couples
(Figure 5). Figure 6 shows the repartition of couples by both spouses’ education in 1991-92 and
in 2007-08. The fraction of couples where both spouses are high-school dropouts has been divided
by two. Simultaneously, the fraction of couples where both spouses have higher education has
doubled during the period.
4We estimate a different FVI for each year. However, between two consecutive years with no change in marital
status, the FVI changes by less than 15% for more than 80% of individuals. This change has no clear direction
and is centred around 0.
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Figure 1: Wages and labour supply by gender and marital status
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Figure 2: Gender Wage Ratio
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Figure 3: Distribution of wages in the population
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Figure 4: Distribution of female wage share of aggregate wage within couples ( wfwf+wm )
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Figure 5: Changes in education by gender and marital status
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Figure 6: Distribution of education within couples
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3 Theoretical Framework
The aim of this paper is to perform a decomposition of the observed dynamics of household
labour supply and matching patterns. We want to quantify how much of these changes results
from composition changes (e.g. from a higher proportion of educated and high wage women),
and how much results from changes in preferences and/or home production. To carry out this
exercise we need a model. This section provides a presentation of a simplified version of the
structural search and matching model of marriage with labour supply first introduced by GJR.
3.1 Overview of the model
We consider a population of individuals segmented by gender. Men and women are heterogeneous
in characteristics such as education, wages and family values, assumed observable and fixed.
Each unique combination of characteristics defines a type.
Single individuals randomly meet in the marriage market. There is no search during marriage.
Upon meeting, they must decide whether to accept the current match or wait for a better
potential partner. The overall distribution of types by gender is exogenous, but the distributions
of types by gender and marital status is endogenous.
The matching decision is modelled as follows. A fraction of household resources is used to
produce a public good. If two potential partners home-produce more together than separately
(through task specialization, so as to give birth to children, etc.) a surplus is produced that is
shared between spouses by Nash bargaining, using the value of being single as the outside option.
Matching occurs if the match surplus is positive. Through Nash bargaining partners determine
optimal levels of income transfers between them and also how much to save, collectively, in order
to finance home production.
In the real world there is no such thing as perfect homogamy. Empirical perfect assignment
models of the marriage market account for such mismatch by assuming i.i.d measurement error
in the marriage surplus (Choo and Siow, 2006, Galichon and Salanié, 2012, Dupuy and Galichon,
2014). We rather consider an idiosyncratic source of heterogeneity in the match surplus that
affects the level of the home-produced public good. In addition, the match-specific component
is subject to shocks, which is a way of endogenizing divorce. If the couple does not separate as
a result of the match-specific shock, transfers may yet be renegotiated to different levels in the
same way as before.
3.2 Meetings, marriages and divorces
Types are denoted i for males and j for females, and we use the subscripts m and f to index
gender. The number of individuals of each type is given by the density functions `m(i) and `f (j),
with Lm =
´
`m(i) di and Lf =
´
`f (j) dj. Let m(i, j) denote the number of couples of a given
type in the population, resulting in M =
˜
m(i, j) didj couples in the whole population. Let
nm(i), nf (j), Nm, Nf denote the corresponding densities and number of individuals for singles.
These quantities are related to each other by simple accounting restrictions,
`m(i) = nm(i) +
ˆ
m(i, j) dj, `f (j) = nf (j) +
ˆ
m(i, j) di. (3.1)
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We denote as λm and λf the rates at which male and female singles meet other singles
per unit of time. The number of males meeting a female (λmNm) is equal to the number
of females meeting a male (λfNf ). Let λ = λm/Nf = λf/Nm. Let αij denote the equilibrium
probability of marriage for a male of type i meeting a female of type j. Although this probability
is type-specific (through the type-dependency of partners surplus from marriage) the meeting
probabilities are assumed to be the same for all individuals of a given gender. In principle,
we could allow for some amount of directed search whereby high educated males would have a
higher probability of meeting high educated females for example. However, if we go too far in the
direction of heterogeneous meeting rates, then, absent data on dating, the separate identification
of meeting/divorce rates (λ and δ) and matching probabilities becomes difficult if not simply
impossible.
For a given value of αij , the number of new marriages (or cohabitations) of type (i, j) per
unit of time is
MF (i, j) = nm(i)λm
nf (j)
Nf
αij = nf (j)λf
nm(i)
Nm
αij = λnm(i)nf (j)αij .
It has three components: a single male of type i, out of the nm(i) identical ones, meets a single
female with probability λm = λNf ; this woman is of type j with probability nf (j)/Nf ; the
marriage is consummated with probability αij .
The marriage probability αij is a non-degenerate probability because there exists a match-
specific utility component z that is drawn from a distribution G at the first meeting. This
random utility component generates heterogeneity in the matching decisions. In addition, we
allow the match-specific component to be updated infrequently through i.i.d. shocks from the
same distribution G according to a Poisson process with parameter δ. Spouses’ decision to
remain together results from the updated surplus of the current match: divorce occurs if the
updated value of z does no longer satisfy the matching rule. This happens with probability
1− αij . The flow of (i, j) divorces per unit of time is thus equal to
DF (i, j) = m(i, j) δ (1− αij).
Thanks to this match dissolution mechanism, the observed flow of divorce DF (i, j), and the
number of (i, j) couples, m(i, j), also contribute to the identification of the matching parameters
(see GJR for details). Note that this mechanism explains why many matches will end relatively
quickly, the divorce rate stabilizing at a low value after the first two years of marriage.
We shall assume that the population is approximately in a steady state. This is a more
reasonable approximation than it may seem at first sight. Indeed, if the flow of new marriage were
vastly superior to the flow of divorces (and not death since we focus on prime age individuals)
then the number of couples would grow, which is not what we see in the data (see Figure 7).
The steady state restriction imposes that flows in and out of the stocks of married couples
of each type exactly balance each other out: for all (i, j), DF (i, j) = MF (i, j), or
δ (1− αij)m(i, j) = λnm(i)nf (j)αij .
This defines the equilibrium number of (i, j) couples asm(i, j) = λδ
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j)nm(i)nf (j). Given the
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Figure 7: Shares of married and unmarried by gender
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accounting restrictions (3.1), the equilibrium measures of singles are solutions to the following
fixed-point system:
nm(i) =
`m(i)
1 + λδ
´
nf (j)
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j) dj
, nf (j) =
`f (j)
1 + λδ
´
nm(i)
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j) di
. (3.2)
3.3 Preferences and home production
The instantaneous flow of utility enjoyed either as a single or as a spouse is drawn from private
consumption c0 (whose price is normalized to one), private leisure e, and a public good q that
is produced in-house. We normalize to one the total amount of time available per week to
any individual. So market hours is h ≡ 1 − e, and wi is both the wage rate and the total
income available to the individual. For simplicity, wages are assumed perfectly observable and
deterministic.
Since home production is not observed, we normalize it by setting his value equal to 1 for
singles. And for married couples, we assume that home production only requires some amount
of market good expenditure c, namely,
q = zF 1ij(c), F
1
ij(c) = Zij (c− Cij)K .
The scale shifter Zij is a deterministic source of externality that only depends on spouses’ types.
For identification we shall introduce type complementarities (interactions) only in the match
quality parameter Zij , and not in minimal expenditure Cij .
A single of type i has his/her entire total income wi free to allocate between consumption
and leisure: c0 + wie = wi. For a married couple of male-female type (i, j), we have
c0m + wiem = wi − tm ≡ Rm, c0f + wjef = wj − tf ≡ Rf ,
where transfers tm, tf are used to finance the home production input: c = tm + tf . Note that
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transfers can be negative, but not both at the same time. Transfers are a way of redistributing
resources to children as well as between spouses.
Individual with exogenous characteristics i draw utility Ui(c0, e, q) from privation consump-
tion, leisure and the public good. Assuming corner solutions away, we will work with the
corresponding indirect utility, assumed to be of the quasi-linear form:
ψi(R, q) ≡ max{Ui(c0, e, q) : c0 > 0, 1 > e > 0, c0 + wie ≤ R} = qR−Ai(wi)
Bi(wi)
, (3.3)
where Ai and Bi are differentiable, non-decreasing and concave functions of the wage wi and
other individual characteristics such as gender and education.5 This specification is standard
in the labour supply literature (linear demand systems). We also normalize the denominator as
Bi(1) = 1. The demands for consumption and leisure follow from the indirect utility function
by application of Roy’s identity.
3.4 Marriage contracts
Transfers and the quantity of public good produced are determined by the marriage contract that
spouses sign upon meeting. We assume that individuals can walk away from the negotiation
at any time. Marriage contracts must thus be mutually beneficial for their whole duration.
Specifically, the contract between a male of type i and a female of type j, endowed with a given
draw of the current match-specific shock z, specifies a per-period utility level for both spouses, um
and uf (generated using the indirect utility previously described), and two promised continuation
values, V 1m(z′) and V 1f (z
′), for any realization z′ of the next match-specific shock. We index u
and V 1 by subscripts m and f instead of i and j because they are at this point variables that
remain to be determined. The equilibrium solutions will be functions of types i and j.
Let Wm and Wf denote the present value of a marriage contract for any given choice of
(um, uf , V
1
m, V
1
f ), and let V
0
i and V
0
j similarly denote the value of single-hood for type-i men
and type-j women. Let r denote the discount rate. The marriage values are related to the values
of remaining single by the following Bellman equation:
rWm = um + δ
ˆ [
max
{
V 0i , V
1
m(z
′)
}−Wm]dG(z′), (3.4)
The flow value of marriage is the sum of the instantaneous utility and a term that values the
event of a shock to the match-specific component. With probability δ there is a shock and a new
value z′ is drawn from distribution G. If the new value of marriage V 1m(z′) is less than the value
of single-hood V 0i a divorce occurs; otherwise the match continues with a new way of sharing
resources.
Marriage utilities um, uf depend on optimal choices of c, tm, tf as
um = ψi(wi − tm, q), uf = ψj(wj − tf , q), with q = zF 1ij(c).
The household first determines the optimal choice of c, tm, tf by maximizing the Nash bargaining
5The symbol ≡ means “equal by definition”.
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criterion
max
c,tm,tf
(
Wm − V 0i
)β (
Wf − V 0j
)1−β
, (3.5)
subject to the feasibility constraint c = tm + tf , and where β is a bargaining parameter.
Without commitment, the promise-keeping constraint imposes that Wm = V 1m(z). Denoting
x+ ≡ max{x, 0}, the equilibrium surplus from marriage follows as
(r + δ)
[
V 1m(z)− V 0i
]
= um + δ
ˆ [
V 1m(z
′)− V 0i
]+
dG(z′)− rV 0i , (3.6)
with a symmetric expression for V 1f (z). Note that the equilibrium value of a marriage contract
between spouses is a function of types i, j and z. We shall use the notation V 1m(i, j, z), V 1f (i, j, z)
whenever necessary to make precise the dependence on i, j.
The matching probability is the probability that the participation constraint holds at the
current value of (i, j, z), that is
αij = Pr{V 1m(z)− V 0i ≥ 0 and V 1f (z)− V 0j ≥ 0}.
The present value of single-hood follows as
rV 0i = ψi(wi, 1) + λ
¨ [
V 1m(i, j, z)− V 0i
]
× 1{V 1m(z)− V 0i ≥ 0 and V 1f (z)− V 0j ≥ 0} dG(z)nf (j) dj, (3.7)
The continuation value is the expected value of marriage. For this a meeting must occur and the
contract that results from Nash bargaining must make marriage preferable to remaining single
for both dating individuals.
3.5 Equilibrium solution with transferable utility
We show in GJR that the equilibrium of this economy satisfies two important properties. First,
domestic production is determined independently of transfers and continuation values (separa-
bility): public good expenditures only depends on individual characteristics and preferences.
Secondly, there exists a function Sij(z) measuring the surplus from marriage of a male of type i
and a female of type j whose match specific draw is z. This surplus is shared between spouses
and matching requires positive surplus (transferability). We summarize below the main steps
of the model solution, and highlight the relationships that allow to estimate the model from
observed consumption and matching patterns.
3.5.1 Equilibrium households consumption
The first order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem (3.5) with respect to domestic pro-
duction are
∂ lnF 1ij(c)
∂c
=
K
c− Cij
=
1
X
,
where X ≡ wi + wj − Ai − Aj − c is the net total private expenditure, i.e. what is left of
total income wi + wj to be spent on private consumption and leisure after spending c on home
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production above and beyond the minimal expenditures Ai + Aj . Optimal home production
expenditure then follows as
c(i, j) =
Cij +K(wi + wj −Ai −Aj)
1 +K
, (3.8)
and the equilibrium values of net private expenditure and domestic production is
Xij =
wi + wj −Ai −Aj − Cij
1 +K
, F 1ij = ZijK
KXKij . (3.9)
Thanks to the multiplicative nature of the public good provision rule, these equilibrium quanti-
ties only depend on individual characteristics and not on the match specific shock.
3.5.2 Surplus sharing
The match surplus results from the first-order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem (3.5)
with respect to transfers,
qβ
Bi(r + δ)[V 1m(z)− V 0i ]
=
q(1− β)
Bj(r + δ)[V 1f (z)− V 0j ]
=
q
Sij(z)
(3.10)
where
Sij(z) ≡ Bi(r + δ)[V 1m(z)− V 0i ] +Bj(r + δ)[V 1f (z)− V 0j ]
defines the match surplus.
Denote Sij ≡
´
Sij(z
′)+ dG(z′) the integrated surplus. The promise keeping constraint (3.6)
implies that the match surplus satisfies the following Bellman equation:6
Sij(z) = qXij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j +
δ
r + δ
Sij . (3.11)
The equilibrium integrated surplus then solves the fixed-point equation:
Sij = F
1
ij Xij G
(
BirV
0
i +BjrV
0
j − δr+δSij
F 1ij Xij
)
, (3.12)
where G(s) ≡ ´ (z − s)+ dG(z) = ´ +∞s z dG(z)− s[1−G(s)].7
These equations allow to calculate the integrated surplus and the match surplus given the
values of being/remaining single. The probability that a match (i, j, z) is consummated then
follows as
αij = Pr{Sij(z) > 0} = 1−G
[
G−1
(
Sij
F 1ij Xij
)]
. (3.13)
Finally, the value of single-hood is the sum of the utility flow of being single plus the option
6See GJR, Appendix A for details on the algebra.
7The function G is decreasing and invertible on the support of G, with G′ = −(1−G). It is thus a contracting
operator.
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value of marriage. The equilibrium rent-sharing equations (3.10) imply that
BirV
0
i = Biψ
0
i +
λβ
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnf (j) dj,
BjrV
0
j = Bjψ
0
j +
λ(1− β)
r + δ
ˆ
Sijnm(i) di.
(3.14)
Note that the equilibrium is fully characterized by BrV 0i , BjrV
0
j , nm(i), and nf (j). In
practice, the equilibrium is computed by iterating on equations (3.2), (3.14) until convergence,
making use of equations (3.12), (3.13) to compute αij and with Nm =
´
nm(i) di and Nf =´
nf (j) dj.
Lastly, some algebra shows that equilibrium transfers tm(i, j, z) and tf (i, j, z) are a way of
sharing net total private expenditure Xij :
wi −Ai − tm = βij(z)Xij , wj −Aj − tf = [1− βij(z)]Xij . (3.15)
The sharing rule βij(z) depends on the bargaining parameter β and the outside option (single-
hood) in the following way:
βij(z) = β +
1
z
(1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
F 1ij Xij
. (3.16)
This equation shows how outside options (single-hood) can move the sharing rule above or below
the exogenous bargaining power level β.
4 Estimation and results
The model is estimated on BHPS data. We first describe how structural components of the
model depend on observables, and discuss identification.
4.1 Parametric specification
We introduce exogenous variations in the structural components of the model through several
dimensions of observable heterogeneity: gender gi, education Edi, wage wi and the family values
index xi. We specify preference parameters as
Ai = −a0g(Edi)
bg
+
a1g
1− bgwi +
a2g
2− bgw
2
i , lnBi = bg lnwi, gi = g ∈ {m, f},
with a0g(Edi) = a0gH or a0gL, depending on the education indicator Edi ∈ {H,L}, where L
refers to high school dropout or vocational and H to higher education (high school and higher).
The demand for leisure, with given transfer ti (ti = 0 for singles), thus writes:
wiei = a0g(Edi) + a1gwi + a2gw
2
i + bgRi, with Ri = wi − ti. (4.1)
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Domestic production depends on gender, education and family values but not on wages:
Cij ≡ C + cmH1(Edi = H) + cfH1(Edj = H) + c1mxi + c1fxj ,
where C, cmH , cfH , c1m, c1f are 5 scalar parameters and 1(Edi = H) is equal to 1 if Edi = H
and 0 otherwise. Public good quality Zij is a general function of spouses’ characteristics:
Zij ≡ Z(Edi, wi, xi, Edj , wj , xj),
that will be estimated non-parametrically. We let Zij depend on wages and on interactions be-
tween male and female factors. This will allow us to estimate the source of marriage externalities
that is not already accounted for by resource sharing through common funding of the public
good.
Lastly, the distribution of match-specific shocks z is log-normal: G(z) = Φ(ln(z)/σz), where
Φ is the standard normal cdf and σz is the standard deviation of z. We then have
G(s) = −sΦ
(
− ln s
σz
)
+ e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
− ln s
σz
+ σz
)
.
4.2 Identification
We prove identification without data on domestic production inputs under the preceding para-
metric specification, assuming in particular that 1) Zij depends on interactions between spouses’
types but not Cij , and 2) Cij does not depend on wages.
First, matching parameters λ, δ, αij are directly inferred from observed flows by type on the
marriage market. Second, preference parameters are identified from labour supply as follows.
For singles, equation (4.1) takes the form:
wie
0 = a0g(Edi) + (a1g + bg)wi + a2gw
2
i . (4.2)
Without separate variation in income and wages, a1g + bg is identified but not a1g and bg
separately. This is the usual identification issue with labour supply models. Parameters a1g and
bg are not separately identified unless a source of non-earned income is observed. For married
couples, the leisure equation (4.1) together with equations (3.15), (3.16) for transfers imply that
wie
1
m =
a1m
1− bmwi +
2a2m
2− bmw
2
i + bmβij(z)Xij ,
wje
1
f =
a1f
1− bf wj +
2a2f
2− bf w
2
j + bf [1− βij(z)]Xij .
(4.3)
The important empirical implication of this equation is that leisure demands e1m and e1f exhibit
variations that are independent of wages. These variations come not only from the match-
specific component z, but also from the interactions betweens observable spouses’ characteristics.
Moreover, under the assumption that complementarities (such as interactions between spouses’
education levels) affect parameter Zij but not Cij , then the net private expenditure Xij =
wi+wj−Cij−Ai−Aj
1+K does not depend on interactions terms while βij(z) does. This restriction on
individual characteristics thus generates further independent variations in the leisure equations.
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Denote ζ one such observable interaction term, assumed continuous for simplicity.8 Differ-
entiating equations (4.3), with ∂βij(z)/∂ζ 6= 0, we obtain an identifying restriction for bm/bf :
∂(wie
1
m)/∂ζ
∂(wje1f )/∂ζ
=
bm
bf
. (4.4)
Next, eliminating βij(z) from equations (4.3) yields
wi
bm
(
e1m −
a1m
1− bm −
2a2m
2− bmwi
)
+
wj
bf
(
e1f −
a1f
1− bf −
2a2f
2− bf wj
)
= Xij =
wi + wj − Cij −Ai −Aj
1 +K
. (4.5)
Assuming further that Cij does not depend on wages, one can differentiate this equation with
respect to wages wi and wj and obtain two additional restrictions involving bm, bf and K (given
that the other preference parameters are already identified by the leisure equations for singles).
That makes three equations for three parameters that generically suffice for identification.
Once preference parameters and elasticity K have been identified, equation (4.5) identifies
Cij . The identification of bargaining power β and of the variance of the match-specific component
z finally follow as in GJR.
4.3 Parameter estimates
The model is separately estimated for every couple of years in the list 1991-92, 93-94, ..., 2007-08
by GMM as explained in the Appendix. The results are displayed in Table 1. The parameters
driving the demand for leisure seem to increase overtime. The parameter a0 strongly increases for
men (particularly for educated men). There is no clear monotonic trend for the other parameters,
but some slight tendency. For women, the parameter a1 slightly increases and the negative
parameter a2 decreases in absolute value. Besides b1 increase for both genders. Domestic
production constant cost (C) decreases overtime. On average, men’s education increases the
domestic production cost whereas women’s education decreases the domestic production cost but
less and less overtime. Finally, high family values decrease domestic production cost, particularly
so for women, but this effect seems to decrease overtime. The bargaining power coefficient is
estimated around 0.5, which implies that the balance of powers between spouses in the family
is only function of the outside options.9
Our model delivers a non-parametric estimate of the match quality parameter Zij . This is a
complex function of spouses’ wages, education and family values indices. In Table 2 we present
the results of the least-square projection of lnZij on indicators of the wage differential, and the
education and family values of both spouses, including interactions. The match quality clearly
and significantly decreases with the relative wage of the female spouse. At the same time, there
is strong evidence of homophily in education. There are few obvious trends in the parameters.
The only obvious one is for female education – educated women becoming more “attractive” over
the years.
8Note that cross-wage interactions wi ∗ wj will not work for ζ if they does not determine Zij .
9σz is not well estimated as we do not obtain convergence in each period (see appendix B, step 3). Instead,
we fix it at 0.38 for all periods.
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Table 1: Estimated Parameters
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
β 0.4806 0.4802 0.4927 0.4843 0.4815 0.4813 0.5025 0.4804 0.4847
(0.1595) (0.1722) (0.1600) (0.1453) (0.1863) (0.1621) (0.1079) (0.1147) (0.1370)
Preferences
a0fL 0.5031 0.5690 0.5013 0.5829 0.5896 0.5165 0.5877 0.5412 0.5155
(0.1326) (0.1400) (0.1670) (0.1641) (0.2101) (0.2339) (0.2262) (0.2169) (0.2247)
a0mL 0.8819 0.8336 0.8463 0.6000 0.8651 1.0954 1.2732 1.1087 1.0897
(0.1333) (0.1300) (0.1453) (0.1219) (0.1510) (0.1559) (0.1795) (0.1316) (0.1377)
a0fH 0.5005 0.5001 0.5390 0.5010 0.5012 0.5011 0.5057 0.5002 0.5013
(0.1336) (0.1432) (0.1701) (0.1682) (0.2189) (0.2336) (0.2267) (0.2196) (0.2198)
a0mH 1.0673 1.1853 1.0315 0.8859 1.0848 1.3553 1.5099 1.4247 1.5335
(0.1371) (0.1361) (0.1575) (0.1329) (0.1631) (0.1647) (0.1846) (0.1420) (0.1426)
a1f 0.2845 0.2842 0.2658 0.2752 0.2870 0.2785 0.3314 0.3008 0.2836
(0.0765) (0.0763) (0.0669) (0.0484) (0.0600) (0.0675) (0.0679) (0.0722) (0.1073)
a1m 0.1608 0.2042 0.1676 0.2032 0.1433 0.1465 0.1616 0.1863 0.1696
(0.0650) (0.0625) (0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0610) (0.0677) (0.0683) (0.0523) (0.0529)
a2f -0.0091 -0.0090 -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0065 -0.0064 -0.0079 -0.0080 -0.0079
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0021)
a2m 0.0035 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0006 0.0010 0.0014 0.0010 0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0010)
b1f 0.3586 0.3626 0.3957 0.3846 0.3667 0.3740 0.3456 0.3733 0.3996
(0.0647) (0.0635) (0.0621) (0.0469) (0.0501) (0.0595) (0.0654) (0.0694) (0.0949)
b1m 0.2501 0.2506 0.2886 0.2812 0.3118 0.2988 0.2638 0.2504 0.2746
(0.0464) (0.0456) (0.0453) (0.0402) (0.0538) (0.0544) (0.0491) (0.0431) (0.0507)
Home production
C 3.9363 3.7017 3.3038 4.4963 3.7167 4.1636 4.6001 4.2404 2.7159
(1.7211) (1.5909) (1.3347) (1.0997) (1.2157) (1.5382) (2.0061) (1.8102) (1.9418)
c1f -0.5930 -0.6087 -0.5214 -0.7518 -0.5352 -0.5584 -0.5297 -0.5014 -0.5052
(0.2389) (0.2600) (0.2651) (0.2086) (0.2259) (0.2538) (0.2825) (0.2621) (0.2817)
c1m -0.4969 -0.3636 -0.2974 -0.4311 -0.3728 -0.5189 -0.4091 -0.3754 0.1374
(0.2413) (0.2418) (0.2910) (0.2229) (0.2335) (0.2647) (0.3699) (0.3726) (0.3665)
cfH -1.2049 -0.9055 -0.4120 -0.5015 -0.5362 -0.3395 -0.9060 -1.0889 -1.0400
(0.3544) (0.3250) (0.2828) (0.2528) (0.2555) (0.2651) (0.3606) (0.3350) (0.3380)
cmH 0.5771 0.9064 0.1436 0.6296 0.2497 -0.0755 -0.6154 0.0579 0.6167
(0.3128) (0.3572) (0.3012) (0.2668) (0.2819) (0.3234) (0.3801) (0.3538) (0.3490)
K 0.0142 0.0140 0.0214 0.0185 0.0093 0.0048 0.0080 0.0092 0.0080
(0.0691) (0.0639) (0.0561) (0.0489) (0.0446) (0.0478) (0.0614) (0.0532) (0.0601)
Note. Preference parameters estimated separately for every couple of years. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Matching preferences
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Intercept 0.890 0.746 0.778 0.773 0.640 0.732 0.694 0.766 0.540
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)[
0.25 <
wf
wf+wm
≤ 0.50
]
-0.074 -0.022 -0.044 -0.054 -0.051 -0.054 -0.095 -0.115 -0.049
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)[
0.50 <
wf
wf+wm
≤ 0.70
]
-0.130 -0.068 -0.107 -0.114 -0.129 -0.139 -0.174 -0.173 -0.093
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)[
0.70 <
wf
wf+wm
]
-0.251 -0.185 -0.270 -0.274 -0.295 -0.242 -0.287 -0.237 -0.196
(0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
FV Im -0.156 -0.148 -0.163 -0.144 -0.134 -0.160 -0.147 -0.146 -0.072
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
FV If -0.127 -0.123 -0.146 -0.133 -0.107 -0.142 -0.109 -0.113 -0.099
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
FV Im ∗ FV If 0.041 0.043 0.053 0.047 0.048 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.040
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(Educm = HS) -0.095 -0.041 -0.085 -0.017 -0.024 -0.046 -0.052 -0.064 -0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
(Educf = HS) -0.191 -0.131 -0.074 -0.092 -0.064 0.012 0.040 0.009 -0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
(Educm > HS) -0.214 -0.200 -0.159 -0.152 -0.201 -0.203 -0.232 -0.216 -0.203
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
(Educf > HS) -0.214 -0.181 -0.195 -0.223 -0.229 -0.189 -0.217 -0.192 -0.158
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(Educm = HS) ∗ (Educf = HS) 0.186 0.162 0.171 0.111 0.081 0.038 0.077 0.084 0.074
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
(Educm > HS) ∗ (Educf > HS) 0.403 0.397 0.375 0.346 0.378 0.413 0.422 0.409 0.379
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
(Educm > HS) ∗ (Educf = HS) 0.164 0.187 0.142 0.142 0.155 0.184 0.193 0.183 0.216
(0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
(Educm = HS) ∗ (Educf > HS) 0.132 0.138 0.187 0.139 0.103 0.123 0.148 0.131 0.118
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.51 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.32
Note. Least-square projection of lnZij on the regressors. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 8: Fit of market work trends and wage trends
(a) Market work
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Married Men, Actual
Married Men, Predicted
Married Women, Actual
Married Women, Predicted
Single Men, Actual
Single Men, Predicted
Single Women, Actual
Single Women, Predicted
(b) Wages
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
5
10
15
20
Married Men, Actual
Married Men, Predicted
Married Women, Actual
Married Women, Predicted
Single Men, Actual
Single Men, Predicted
Single Women, Actual
Single Women, Predicted
(c) Population stocks (prediction error)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Δ N
m
/N
m
Δ Nf/Nf
Δ M/M
4.4 Model fit
Starting from random initial distributions of single and couples in the population, we simulate
the equilibrium and predict the distributions of characteristics among couples and singles and
labour supplies. Our model performs well in predicting the average labour supplies of men and
women by marital status over the period (Figure 8). The model also predicts the equilibrium
number of singles and couples with less than 5% of error for each period. Finally the prediction
of working hours conditionally on wages and education is also quite good (Figure 9), and so is
the fit of the distribution of female relative earnings and wages (Figure 10).
4.5 Counterfactual analysis
We now turn to the main empirical question of the paper: what are the main components of
the changes in labour supply and sorting shown in Section 2? Three main factors and their
evolutions can explain these changes: the distributions of characteristics in the population of
males and females (in particular, wages and education); preferences and home production; and
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Figure 9: Market work simulations in 2007-08
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Figure 10: Fit of distribution of female spouse’s share of total labour earnings and wages in
2007-08
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(b) Labor earnings, cdf
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public good quality.
To separately identify the specific contribution of each one of these factors, we run three
counterfactual experiments. In the first experiment, we fix Zij at its estimated 1991 value and
we simulate a new equilibrium for each two-year observation sample between 1991 and 2008
(the other parameters being set equal to their estimated values in all years). In the second
counterfactual simulation, we let Zij vary according to its estimated value in each year and we
keep all other parameters fixed at their 1991 values. In the last experiment, only composition
effects are allowed for (changes in the exogenous distributions of exogenous characteristics).
The remaining figures of the paper clearly show that preferences are responsible for the
observed changes in labour supply, and public good quality accounts for the changes in marriage
sorting. Without the estimated variation in Zij (Figures 11, 12) there are fewer marriages and
the number of singles tends to be overestimated. Moreover, the wages of married men and
women are well predicted, but the wages of singles are overestimated. This is because there
is more education complementarity in 2007 than in 1991. So with the 1991 parameters we
simulate fewer marriages between high educated individuals. Consequently, the wages of singles
increase. Without the estimated variations in the preference parameters (Figures 13, 14), the
labour market supply of women and single men would be much higher than observed. A look at
Table 1 shows that the preference for leisure has increased over time for both men and women.
Lastly, if we fix all parameters (preferences and public good quality), we obtain the worst of the
two worlds (figures available upon request).
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Figure 11: Counterfactual trends
(All parameters vary; but Zij stays at 1991 level)
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Figure 12: Counterfactual market hours in 2007-08
(All parameters vary; but Zij stays at 1991 level)
(a) Market work conditional on wage quantile
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(b) Market work conditional on education level
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Figure 13: Counterfactual trends
(Only Zij varies; all other parameters remain fixed at 1991 value)
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Figure 14: Counterfactual market hours in 2007-08
(Only Zij varies; all other parameters remain fixed at 1991 value)
(a) Market work conditional on wage quantile
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(b) Market work conditional on education level
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a version of GJR’s search-matching model of the marriage
market with labour supply but without home production time inputs. We derive conditions
under which the marriage and household labour supply model remains identified. We estimate
the model using GMM on data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2008,
and we allow preference parameters to evolve over the observation period. We show that the
preference for leisure of men should change over time in order to fit the observed dynamics in
labour supply. We also need to allow for changes in the strength of homophily (in particular
with respect to spouses’ education) in order to explain the observed changes in sorting. As GJR
obtain a good fit of the data with time-invariant parameters, we conclude that it is important
to model family labour supply in conjunction with time spent in home production.
Many labour market policies condition benefits on marital status and the number of children.
This requires a non trivial extension of the model, but one that should be high on the agenda.
Also, one critical assumption that we make in this paper is the time invariance of wages. However,
it is likely that many interesting features of the marriage market could be better fitted with wages
varying with age and subject to stochastic shocks. Such an extension is desirable yet also non
trivial as it will make the model non stationary.
Appendix - Estimation algorithm
Let us consider one two-year cross-section of household data on time uses, gender, wages, family values
and education. We use couples of years to increase sample size. In this section, the index i refers to an
observation unit of the sample of male singles, j refers to female singles, and (i, j) refers to couples. For
singles, we observe labour supply h0i and education Edi ∈ {L,H}, wages wi and family values indices
xi. For couples, the corresponding time use observations are h1mij and h1fij . Leisure is e = 1 − h. The
estimation procedure is iterative and goes through the following steps.
1. Estimate λ, δ, αij from non-parametric estimates of stock densities nm(i), nf (j),m(i, j) and corre-
sponding flows as described in GJR.
2. Given a value for σz, estimate the parameters of preferences and domestic productions, as well as
bargaining power β, by two-stage GMM first with metric equal to the identity matrix and second
with metric equal to the diagonal of the inverse of variance-covariance matrix of moments. GMM
are based on the following residuals and instruments:
(a) For single men, the residuals are
u0i = e
0
i − a0m(Edi)/wi − a1m − a2mwi − bm,
with a similar expression for single women. The instruments are
ξi = (1,1(Edi = H), xi, wi,1(Edi = H)/wi) .
This is the way the exogenous characteristics condition the residuals.
26
(b) For couples, the residuals are
u1ij =
(
e1mij − a1m1−bm − 2a2m2−bmwi − bmβijXij/wi
e1fij − a1f1−bf −
2a2f
2−bf wj − bf (1− βij)Xij/wj
)
,
with
Xij =
wi + wj − Cij −Ai −Aj
1 +K
,
βij = β + E
(
1
z
|z ≥ G−1(1− αij)
)
(1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
F 1ij Xij
.
The instruments are ξi ⊗ ξj . The leisure residuals follow from equations (4.3), (3.15), after
taking the expectation with respect to z. Note that the distribution of z ∼ LN (0, σ2z) implies
that E
(
1
z |z > s
)
= e
σ2z
2 Φ
(
− ln sσz − σz
)
/Φ
(
− ln sσz
)
and that marriage is consummated if z ≥
G−1(1−αij) for the marriage probability to be equal to αij . We back out Sij , BirV 0i , BjrV 0j
and F 1ij Xij from matching probabilities αij , given type densities nm(i), nf (j) and the other
parameters, by solving a fixed-point system similar to the equilibrium system in Section 3.5.
For a more detailed description of this step, see GJR.
3. Estimate σz by fitting the variance-covariance matrix of market hours for couples. Then repeat
steps 2 and 3 until numerical convergence.
4. Lastly, estimate public good quality Zij from (3.9):
Zij = F
1
ij Xij
[
KKX1+Kij
]−1
.
Once the model has been estimated, an economy can be simulated by computing the equilibrium as
indicated in Section 3.5. Specifically, for every two-year cross section, given estimated parameters and
the observed distributions of male and female types in the population (i.e. `m(i), `f (j)), we use the
equilibrium fixed point to calculate conditional distributions nm(i), nf (j),m(i, j) together with values
Sij , BirV
0
i , BjrV
0
j . Note that individual types comprise one continuous variable, the wage, and the
family values index is approximately continuous as it is constructed by aggregation of many discrete
variables. Hence, functions Sij , BirV 0i , BjrV 0j , nm(i), nf (j), m(i, j) have to be discretized and integrals
in equilibrium operators have to be approximated. We rely for that on Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature and
Chebyshev polynomials.
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